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Governments and private landowners have collected royalties on 
mineral resources for centuries. When comprehensive measures to 
account for the environmental externalities of mineral extraction are 
politically or practically unavailable, federal and state governments may 
consider adjusting royalty rates as an expedient way to account for these 
externalities and benefit society. One key policy question that has not 
received attention, however, is whether a royalty rate can and should be 
manipulated in this way, assuming statutory discretion to do so. This 
article fills that gap by evaluating the argument for increasing federal or 
state fossil fuel royalty rates through historical, theoretical, and practical 
lenses. To that end, this article in turn considers the meaning of royalties, 
the economic justifications for royalties, the legislative history of the 
implementation of federal royalties, and the considerations that private 
landowners have relied upon in setting royalties. This article concludes 
that it would be appropriate for governments to adjust mineral royalty 
rates to account for negative externalities not otherwise addressed by 
regulation or to otherwise promote public welfare. Such use of royalties 
is consistent with the historical record. Royalties have been used as 
pragmatic policy tools from almost their inception, and federal and state 
governments have often exercised their existing statutory discretion to 
adjust mineral royalty rates to promote public welfare. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Royalty revenue from coal, oil, and natural gas production on 
federal and state lands is an important source of U.S. federal and state 
government funds. The federal government currently collects about 
$6.23 billion in annual payments from federal leases and shares 
approximately half of these proceeds with the states in which mineral 
production occurs.1 States also collect royalties from mineral resource 
production on their own lands and use the revenue to fund public 
education, infrastructure projects, environmental projects, and other 
useful government spending.2 Thus, setting the appropriate royalty rate 
can have significant implications for public welfare. 
Increasingly, scholars and advocates argue that federal royalty 
rates are set too low, depriving the public of a larger share of revenue 
that is rightfully theirs by failing to account for the negative 
externalities of fossil fuel production borne by the public.3 Fossil fuel 
production results in emissions of greenhouse gases and other air 
pollutants, as well as water pollution, habitat disruption, and other 
environmental harms. These scholars and advocates argue that federal 
royalty rates should reflect these societal costs, and devote 
considerable efforts to calculating the optimal royalty rate to serve 
 
 1. 30 U.S.C. § 191(a)–(b); see also U.S. OFFICE OF NAT. RES., Interior Department 
Disburses $6.23 Billion in FY 2016 Energy Revenues: Federal Revenues Support State, Tribal, 
National Needs (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.onrr.gov/pdfdocs/20161125a.pdf. One exception is 
Alaska, which is entitled to 90 percent of federal royalties for onshore oil, gas, and coal production 
in the state. 30 U.S.C. § 191(a). 
  2. See David Woodgerd & Bernard F. McCarthy, State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas 
Royalty Rates, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 119, 130 (1982) (stating that the state of Montana collects 
royalties from mineral resources to promote public welfare); Headwaters Economics, THE 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL COAL ROYALTY REFORM ON PRICES, PRODUCTION, AND STATE 
REVENUE 5, 17 (May 2015), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/Report-Coal-
Royalty-Reform-Impacts.pdf. 
  3. See, e.g., Jayni Foley Hein, Priorities for Federal Coal Reform, Inst. for Policy Integrity, 
NYU School of Law (June 2016), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/ 
Priorities_for_Coal_Reform.pdf (analyzing the federal coal program); Jayni Foley Hein & Peter 
Howard, Illuminating the Hidden Costs of Coal, Inst. for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law 
(Dec. 2015), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Hidden_Costs_of_Coal.pdf (illustrating 
that externalities of coal have not been included the federal royalties); Spencer Reeder & James 
H. Stock, Federal Coal Leasing Reform Options: Effects on CO2 Emissions and Energy Markets: 
Executive Summary, VULCAN PHILANTHROPIES 4 (Feb. 2016), http://www.vulcan.com/ 
MediaLibraries/Vulcan/Documents/FedCoalLeaseModelResults_ExecutiveSummary_Vulcan_F
INAL_16Feb2016.pdf; Tom Sanzillo, The Great Giveaway: An Analysis of the Costly Failure of 
Federal Coal Leasing in the Powder River Basin, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS 
(2012) (estimating that the federal government lost $28.9 billion in revenues over thirty years due 
to Interior’s failure to receive fair market value for coal mined in the Powder River Basin, which 
produces 43 percent of the nation’s coal). 
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various goals, including accounting for externalities4 and ensuring that 
a “fair market value” is returned to the government.5 
In the final years of the Obama administration, the Department of 
Interior (“Interior”) took notice of several outdated components of the 
federal coal program. On January 15, 2016, Interior announced that it 
would launch a comprehensive review to identify and evaluate 
potential reforms to the program. This review would analyze issues that 
include “how to account for the environmental and public health 
impacts of federal coal production; and how to ensure American 
taxpayers are earning a fair return for the use of their public 
resources.”6 Interior released its Scoping Report in January 2017 and 
committed to further analyzing potential royalty rate increases for 
federal coal that would account for some of the externality costs of coal 
production.7 
On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order 
directing the Secretary of the Interior to end the coal review,8 and 
Secretary Ryan Zinke promptly followed suit.9 President Trump has 
repeatedly stated that he would like to bring back coal by eliminating 
regulations on the industry, many of which reduce externalities 
associated with generating electricity from coal.10 However, President 
 
 4. See Hein & Howard, Illuminating the Hidden Costs of Coal, supra note 3. 
 5. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMICS OF COAL LEASING 
ON FEDERAL LANDS: ENSURING A FAIR RETURN TO TAXPAYERS (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160622_cea_coal_leasing.p
df%22%22 [hereinafter “CEA Coal Report”]. 
         6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, Secretary Jewell 
Launches Comprehensive Review of Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-jewell-launches-comprehensive-review-federal-coal-
program. 
   7. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM: PROGRAMMATIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT - SCOPING REPORT VOL. I, ES-1 (2017), 
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/65353/95059/114965/ 
CoalPEIS_RptsScoping_Vol1_508.pdf. 
   8. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESIDENTIAL 
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROMOTING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Mar. 
28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/presidential-executive-order-
promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1 (“The Secretary of the Interior shall take all 
steps necessary and appropriate to amend or withdraw Secretary’s Order 3338 dated January 15, 
2016 (Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to Modernize the 
Federal Coal Program), and to lift any and all moratoria on Federal land coal leasing activities 
related to Order 3338.”). 
   9. See Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order 3348 (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/03/30/document_gw_01.pdf (revokes the secretaries’ order 
3338). 
   10. On March 28, 2017, President Trump, surrounded by energy-industry executives and coal 
miners, signed an Executive Order designed to back away from Obama-era climate regulations, 
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Trump claims to value getting a good deal, and numerous studies show 
that increasing federal coal royalties can earn more revenue for 
taxpayers.11 As such, increasing a production-based tax in the form of 
a higher royalty rate may be an attractive way for his administration to 
account for externalities without regulation, or to achieve other 
legitimate policy goals, such as earning more revenue for taxpayers. In 
fact, Secretary Zinke established a federal “Royalty Policy 
Committee” comprised of representatives of states, energy companies, 
and tribes, which is tasked with ensuring that “the public receives the 
full value of the natural resources produced from Federal lands.”12 It 
remains to be seen what proposals the committee will put forward. 
Many states may also be interested in using royalty rate reform to 
meet state revenue or other policy goals. Independent studies show 
that increasing federal royalty rates can provide net revenue increases 
to both the states in which mineral production occurs and the federal 
government.13 This additional revenue can be directed back to the 
resource-producing states and communities in which production 
occurs. Some states may also be interested in royalty rate reform for 
environmental purposes such as greenhouse gas emission reduction 
goals, especially as the Trump administration moves away from federal 
climate change regulation.14 
Despite statutory discretion to alter royalty rates, as well as 
momentum during the Obama administration to reevaluate and 
potentially increase them, one policy question that has not received 
 
including the Clean Power Plan. Trump said, “You know what this says? You’re going back to 
work.” Coral Davenport & Alissa J. Rubin, Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama 
Climate Policies, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-
executive-order-climate-change.html; see also Donald Trump’s Contract with the American 
Voter, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf 
(“FIFTH, I will lift the restrictions on the production of $50 trillion dollars’ worth of job-
producing American energy reserves, including shale, oil, natural gas and clean coal.”). 
   11. See, e.g., CEA Coal Report, supra note 5 (analysis of the federal coal leasing program); 
Hein & Howard, Illuminating the Hidden Costs of Coal, supra note 3; Reeder & Stock, Federal 
Coal Leasing Reform Options, supra note 3; 
   12. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2017_signed_charter_royalty_policy_committee_
03_29_17.pdf. 
   13. See, e.g., Mark Haggerty, An Assessment of U.S. Federal Coal Royalties: Current Royalty 
Structure, Effective Royalty Rates, and Reform Options, 8 HEADWATERS ECON. (2015), 
http://headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wp-content/uploads/Report-Coal-Royalty-Valuation.pdf  
(Demonstrating potential royalty rate increases within the context of coal production). 
   14. See Brad Plummer, Donald Trump is Preparing to Make Massive Policy Changes at the 
EPA, VOX (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/1/23/14356652/ 
trump-epa-regulations (“Trump’s team will move to tackle many of the existing environmental 
rules and regulations put in place under Obama”). 
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attention in the literature is whether there is some theoretical basis or 
historical precedent for modifying royalty rates to meet public policy 
goals. This article fills that gap, evaluating the argument for increasing 
federal or state fossil fuel royalty rates through historical, theoretical, 
and practical lenses. To that end, this article in turn considers the 
historical meaning of royalties, the economic justifications for 
royalties, the legislative history of the implementation of federal 
royalties, and considerations that private landowners have relied upon 
in setting royalties. While royalties typically have a revenue or profit-
sharing component, a common thread in our research that may be 
especially relevant to federal and state governments is that royalties 
have historically been used as policy levers to help set national, state, 
or private priorities for land, resources, or property use. For example, 
the United States government has set royalties at specific rates to 
encourage resource production, encourage westward expansion, and 
deter socially undesirable behavior. Accordingly, this article concludes 
that it would be reasonable for federal and state governments to adjust 
mineral royalty rates to account for negative externalities that are not 
otherwise addressed by regulation, or to otherwise promote public 
welfare. 
The article begins with a review of the common law origins of 
royalties for mineral resource extraction. Royalties were paid to the 
sovereign or to private landowners in order to share the value of the 
resource and for the privilege of mining on the property. Next, Part II 
describes the economic theories used as justifications for royalties: the 
owner’s share of differential returns on mines given their superior 
productivity (economic rent); payments to the owner for minerals 
removed (user cost); and compensation for negative externalities from 
the extraction or use of minerals. 
In Part III, the article reviews the legislative history of mineral 
resource extraction law and policy in the United States, with a focus on 
federal royalties. The federal government has consistently used leasing 
policies and royalty rates as policy levers to advance the national 
interest and to compensate the public for the removal of mineral 
resources. Beginning in the 20th century, legislative history also reveals 
growing attention to the relationship between fossil fuel royalty rates 
and externalities. This trend has shown itself through state and federal 
government revenue sharing arrangements; the Land and Water 
Conservation Fund, which directs a portion of oil and gas royalty 
revenue to conservation and environmental mitigation; and recent calls  
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for hardrock mining royalty reform on the basis of the externalities 
associated with such production. 
Finally, Part IV of the article briefly examines decisions private 
parties make when leasing their land to third parties for mineral 
extraction. Like public royalty rates, private royalty rates and mineral 
resource leases are influenced by diverse factors, including expected 
economic rent, characteristics of the resource, competition for the 
lease, and externalities that may affect the leaseholder, such as noise 
and pollution. By examining the decisions private parties make to 
maximize their self-interest, this Article highlights the factors 
government decision makers should consider when acting in society’s 
best interest. 
Taken together, the historical and economic justifications for 
royalties support federal and state governments exercising their 
existing statutory discretion to raise mineral resource royalty rates to 
account for factors such as negative externalities, including those 
resulting from carbon dioxide and methane emissions. Indeed, 
exercising this discretion would be an expedient and potentially 
lucrative way to align natural resource leasing with greenhouse gas 
reduction goals. This remains a politically viable option even as other 
mechanisms to address climate change appear infeasible in the current 
political environment. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF MINERAL ROYALTIES 
According to some scholars, English common law origins of the 
word “royalty” and concepts of ownership played a role in the 
formation of U.S. common law.15 As early as 1400, the term “royalty” 
was used by the British Crown to describe any “right or privilege 
retained by the crown.”16 It became associated with mineral rights in 
particular by 1580, when the British Crown retained title to all land and 
the right to take any gold or silver discovered on land conveyed.17 By 
1829, the term royalty specifically meant a right retained by a 
landowner under a lease in return for the privilege of working a mine.18 
 
   15. See Robert E. Sullivan, All About Royalties, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7 (1971), 
(“The concepts that minerals are capable of private ownership and that royalty is a payment for 
extraction of minerals may be viewed as incorporated into the laws of the United States as a part 
of the common law.”). 
   16. Dante L. Zarlengo, Royalty Concepts and Present Applications to Federal Oil and Gas 
and Coal Leases, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1986). 
  17. Id.; John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 258 (1996). 
   18. Zarlengo, supra note 16. 
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While today a royalty is akin to a type of rent, at common law it 
was viewed as the actual portion of minerals due to the crown in return 
for the privilege of extraction.19 This concept of a royalty “in kind” 
derived from Roman law and Emperor Gratian’s decree establishing 
the Empire’s right to all mined gold and silver and one-tenth part of all 
other mined minerals.20 Under Roman law, the Roman government 
and landowner each received one-tenth of the mined minerals, which 
resulted in a total royalty of twenty percent.21 The British Crown 
adopted this Roman concept of the right to mined minerals. In addition 
to asserting its royal right derived from Roman law, the British Crown 
also supported its right to a portion of mined minerals with pragmatic 
concerns such as its need for minerals to use in coinage.22 
In England, the type of mine defined the recipient of the royalty: 
for “royal mines” the royalty was paid to the sovereign, whereas for 
other mines it was paid to the landowner for “the privilege of working 
the property.”23 As the common law developed, the English monarch 
maintained exclusive ownership over all silver and gold discovered, 
called the “regalian right.” In contrast, royalties taken on other 
minerals functioned as a “rent or tax” or were sold fee simple, 
depending on local customs.24 For example, in the tin mines of 
Cornwall, the right to work was given to all “free tinners” so long as a 
portion of all minerals extracted were transferred back to the owner, 
usually about one-fifteenth of the product.25 Mining lead in the mines 
of Derbyshire was made contingent on returning one-thirteenth of the 
minerals extracted to the crown or the land’s lessee.26 
Outside of England, the early concept of a “royal fifth” (quinto 
real or quinto del rey in Spanish and Portuguese, respectively) reserved 
to the monarch twenty percent of all precious metals and other 
commodities extracted by mining, acquired by the monarch’s subjects 
as war loot, or found as treasure. The “royal fifth” was instituted in 
 
   19. Id. 
   20. See Katharine K. DuVivier, Sharing the Wealth: Mineral Royalties in Kind, 17A ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1985) (citing W. BAINBRIDGE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MINES AND 
MINERALS 106–08 (5th ed. 1900)) (discussing royalties in kind). 
  21. See Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined 
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part 1, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 547 (1997) (discussing 
royalties on marble) (citing CLYDE PHARR, THE THEODOSIAN CODE AND NOVELS AND THE 
SIRMONDIAN CONSTITUTIONS, Book X, Title 19, 284 (1952)). 
   22. See DuVivier, supra note 20. 
  23. Sullivan, supra note 15 (citing 1 LINDLEY, MINES § 8 (3d ed. 1914)). 
  24. Id. (citing 1 LINDLEY, MINES §§ 2, 3 (3d ed. 1914); 2 SNYDER ON MINES § 1276 (1902)). 
   25. LINDLEY, MINE §§ 2, 5 (3d ed. 1914). 
   26. Id. at § 8. 
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Medieval Muslim states, Christian Iberian kingdoms (including Spain 
and Portugal), and their overseas colonial empires during the age of 
exploration.27 In 1783, King Charles III of Spain dictated the Mining 
Ordinances for New Spain whereby a “fifth part” of the value of all 
minerals produced from mines located in New Spain (much of present-
day Central and South America) was reserved to the crown.28 
A similar story unfolded in American colonies. In all land grants, 
the British Crown reserved for itself a certain fixed proportion of 
minerals discovered in the colonies.29 For example, the Charters of 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
and Virginia reserved one-fifth part of all the gold and silver ore as rent 
to the British Crown.30 After the American Revolution, the new 
United States government sought royalties, too: in 1785, the 
Continental Congress reserved one-third part of all gold, silver, lead, 
and copper mines.31 According to one historical account, “[i]t was the 
force of precedent rather than considerations of public and economic 
policy that suggested those provisions of the ordinance reserving a part 
of the mineral lands for the use of the government.”32 The U.S. 
government later changed course, declaring all mineral lands “free and 
open to exploration and occupation, subject to such regulations as may 
be prescribed by law.”33 
The “regalian” doctrine of ownership of royal metals based on the 
crown’s entitlement to these metals, a theory that prevailed in countries 
such as England and Spain, was not formally recognized in the United 




   27. The specification of the twenty percent royalty rate on war loot was institutionalized 
from the start of the Islamic conquest, with the rate set down in the Quran, in Sura VIII (Al-
Anfal), verse 41: “And know that out of all the booty that ye may acquire (in war), a fifth share 
is assigned to Allah . . . .” (Quran 8:41). 
   28. CHARLES THOMSON, THE ORDINANCES OF THE MINES OF NEW SPAIN: TRANSLATED 
FROM THE ORIGINAL SPANISH, WITH OBSERVATIONS UPON THE MINES AND MINING 
ASSOCIATIONS 142, 147 (1825). 
   29. See LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 31, at 62–63 (describing the crown’s practice of inserting 
clauses into land grants that reserve fixed portions of the royal metals that were discovered). 
   30. Id. 
   31. Id. § 30, at 61. 
   32. Id. § 31, at 54. 
   33. DuVivier, supra note 20; see also LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 55, at 91. 
   34. See LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 80, at 123 (“A grant or conveyance by the United States 
carries all minerals, unless reserved expressly or by implication in the law or instrument 
purporting to pass the title.”). 
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from other countries, it largely derives from express congressional 
legislation, state law, and local rules and customs established in 
different regions.35 
The rest of this article explores the theoretical and historical 
development of natural resource royalties in the United States. In the 
next Part, the article describes the economic justifications for natural 
resource royalties. These justifications, while often not the explicit 
drivers of royalty rates, were influential in defining how stakeholders 
contemplated and explained royalty rates. 
III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ROYALTIES 
Economists have justified mineral royalty payments as the owner’s 
share of differential returns on certain mines given their higher 
productivity (economic rent)36 or as payments to the owner for 
minerals removed (user cost).37 Increasingly, economists have 
considered the relevance of negative externalities from the extraction 
or use of minerals in the calculation of socially optimal royalty rates.38 
This Part describes this economic literature. 
A. Royalty as Economic Rent 
The concept of economic rent has been used as a justification for 
royalty payments.39 Economic rent (also referred to as the Ricardian 
rent) is a payment to the owner of a factor of production that exceeds 
the amount necessary to keep the factor in its current employment.40 
David Ricardo first explored the idea of an agricultural land rent equal 
to the advantage of using a tract of land in its most productive use 
 
   35. Id. § 81, at 124. 
   36. See, e.g., Larry L. Dale, The Pace of Mineral Depletion in the United States, 60(3) LAND 
ECON. 255, 263 (1984) (explaining how the market usually reflects the fair price of these 
resources); John H. Mutti & William E. Morgan, Changing Energy Prices and Economic Rents. 
The Case of Western Coal, 59 LAND ECON. 163, 164–65 (1983) (explaining that royalty payments 
can represents the “diminution in the value of the mine”); John E. Orchard, The Rent of Mineral 
Lands, 36(2) Q.J. ECON. 290, 290 –91 (1922) (describing the disagreement among academics over 
how to explain royalty payments); ROSS GARNAUT & ANTHONY CLUNIES ROSS, TAXATION OF 
MINERAL RENTS 1, 17–36 (Clarendon Press Oxford 1983) (providing an overview of taxation and 
policy issues related to mineral rent). 
   37. See, e.g., Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Orchard, supra note 36; GARNAUT & CLUNIES 
ROSS, supra note 36. 
   38. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 36; Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Orchard, supra note 36; 
GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36. 
   39. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 36; Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Orchard, supra note 36; 
GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36. 
   40. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 
(London 1817), http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP1a.html (Chapter 2). 
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relative to the advantage of using the marginal tract (or the best rent-
free tract) for the same purpose.41 In other words, land rent is the 
payment to the owners of especially fertile land in return for the 
production advantage (or cost savings) associated with using that land. 
Just as agricultural land varies in its fertility, mineral mines vary in 
their production costs due to deposit quality and proximity to markets. 
For this reason, some mines may earn economic rent. For example, a 
coal mine on land with superior coal deposits (say, thicker deposit 
seams located closer to the surface) will be able to produce coal at 
lower cost than will a mine on land with inferior coal deposits (such as 
narrow deposit seams located at great depth).42 Similarly, a mine 
located near an industrial or shipping center will have lower production 
costs than a mine located farther away and subject to higher 
transportation charges.43 The owners of superior mines earning 
economic rent will be able to charge higher royalties. These royalties 
tend to be seen as fair, enabling the mineral owner to share in the 
economic rent arising from the mineral’s superior quality.44 Moreover, 
unlike other forms of taxation, royalties imposed on economic rent 
would not, in principle, distort behavior.45 Of course, if the private costs 
of production do not fully account for the social costs of production 
and no corrective policy measures are taken, then the resulting level of 
production would not be socially optimal. In such a case, even if 
royalties capture more than the economic rent and thereby reduce 
production, the “distortion” in behavior would actually result in a 
production level closer to the socially optimal level.46 
There is evidence that U.S. royalties have historically been 
directed, at least in part, at capturing economic rents.47 John Orchard, 
 
   41. Id. 
   42. See Orchard, supra note 36, at 298. (“The extrinsic powers include transportation and 
market; the intrinsic, thickness of seam, depth, angle of seam, faulting, nature of roof, and the 
like.”). 
   43. Id., at 298–99. 
   44. See GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36, at 21–22. 
   45. Even assuming that there are no externalities and that the royalty perfectly captures 
economic rent, it is possible that, in the long run, the royalty will distort behavior because by 
cutting into the economic rent, it will reduce incentives for discovering high-quality mineral 
deposits. 
   46. CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
   47. Whether a royalty actually captures economic rent is a separate matter. Such a royalty 
would be specific to each site, based on ex ante predictions of economic rent given the site’s 
attributes and associated production costs, which may itself diverge from ex post realized costs. 
See Radford Schantz, Jr., Purpose and Effects of a Royalty on Public Land Minerals, 20(1) 
RESOURCES POLICY 35, 37 (1994) (analyzes the royalties for minerals on public land). Generally 
speaking, a federal royalty could not perfectly capture such rent. See, e.g., P.S. DASGUPTA & G.M 
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in his analysis of the history of mineral rents, argued that in the United 
States, royalties were “partly compensation for the mineral removed 
and partly surplus or economic rent arising through superiority of some 
mines over others.”48 He quoted the secretary of the American 
Institute of Mining Engineers explaining U.S. royalty rates in 1889 as 
follows: “With us the royalty always settles itself according to special 
advantages. The lowest royalty is the royalty that must be paid, or else 
the landowner would not care to let the mine be worked. On top of 
that, you have all those higher royalties coming in to represent special 
natural advantages.”49 He also quoted a Birmingham mining engineer 
as stating in 1919 that “strictly speaking, royalties are partly rent or 
income, and partly capitalization of assets.”50 
Orchard also examined early royalty rates and found that they 
tended to be higher when economic rents were likely to be higher—
that is, when the costs of extraction were low due to the coal’s 
“accessibility, quantity, thickness, depth, value, and other conditions 
that affect the cost of its extraction.”51 For example, Kentucky in 1910 
had a royalty of 8 cents per ton on coal from 3- to 4-feet-thick seams, 
10 cents on coal from 4- to 5-feet-thick seams, and 12 cents on coal from 
5- to 6-feet-thick seams.52 Orchard also noted that the U.S. Geological 
Survey, in its 1910 classification and valuation of government coal 
lands, placed a significantly higher value on lands less than 15 miles 
from a completed railroad.53 According to Orchard, these U.S. 
practices were consistent with practices in European countries at the 
time.54 
 
HEAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES 362 (1980) (“The subject is 
particularly murky, since the structure of optimum taxes often depends sensitively on the 
constraints the government faces in wielding the various controls available to it.”); JAMES OTTO 
ET AL., MINING ROYALTIES: A GLOBAL STUDY OF THEIR IMPACT ON INVESTORS, 
GOVERNMENT, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 30, 94 (World Bank 2006). 
   48. Orchard, supra note 36, at 307–08. Notably, Orchard and the American mining operators 
that he quotes also refer to user costs, a concept discussed infra in the next Section, as partly 
justifying the royalty rate. 
   49. Id. at 296 (quoting Rossiter W. Raymond, an American mining engineer, then secretary 
of the American Institute of Mining Engineers, in his testimony before the British Royal 
Commission on Mining Royalties appointed in 1889). 
  50. Id. (quoting T. H. Bailey, a Birmingham mining engineer, testifying before a 1919 British 
coal commission). 
   51. Id. at 298. 
   52. Id. at 299–300. 
   53. Id. at 299. 
   54. Id. at 302–03. Most illustrative is the French practice in 1890 of setting variable royalty 
rates that ranged from 1/6th of yield for coal mined from the shallowest and thickest seams to 
1/80th of the yield for coal mined from the deepest and thinnest seams. See id. 
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The concern about the “special advantages” of certain mines was 
also evident in the testimony before Congress prior to the adoption of 
the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976. The concern 
apparently motivated the lower royalty rate on coal produced from 
underground mines, which were thought to be more costly to operate. 
Legislative history is discussed more thoroughly in the next Part. 
The discussion of economic rent typically does not involve 
discussion of externalities. But, if environmental regulation is 
otherwise adopted, a “special advantage” of a mine might include its 
low environmental externalities. Such a mine would earn economic 
rent that the public, in turn, could capture through the royalty rate. 
Mines that generate high environmental externalities might earn no 
economic rent or become unprofitable to operate at all. In such a case, 
the mineral owner may prefer for the mineral to stay undeveloped, a 
concept discussed in the next Section. 
B. Royalty as User Cost (or Compensation for Liquidated 
Wealth) 
Unlike the agricultural land on which Ricardo based his theory of 
economic rent, coal is a nonrenewable resource. Its supply is exhausted 
in the long run, at which point economic rent becomes zero. Because 
of the unique characteristics of nonrenewable resources, some 
economists have distinguished between royalties on nonrenewable 
resources and rents, influenced by the work of Harold Hotelling.55 In 
1931, partly in response to the conservation movement, Hotelling 
developed a model of the optimal rate of extraction of a nonrenewable 
resource over time.56 According to Hotelling, profit-maximizing 
competitive firms will extract a mineral resource until the market price 
of the resource equals the production costs of the last unit plus a cost 
equal to the net present value of the forgone future profits had the 
resource remained in the ground (in other words, the cost of not being 
 
   55. This issue has attracted significant debate in economics. Some economists argue that 
royalties for nonrenewable resources are not rents, see, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS Book V, Chapter X, 254, (Macmillan & Co., 8th ed. 1920) (stating that “[a] 
royalty is not a rent, though often so called.”), while others argue that the concept of rent is 
relevant, see e.g., Lewis Cecil Gray, Rent Under the Assumption of Exhaustibility, 28(3) Q.J. 
ECON. 466, 467–70 (1914) (arguing that “the present value of the surplus income from the 
mine . . . is the present value of the total rent in which it will yield”). Still others conclude that 
royalties include both economic rent and user cost. See Orchard, supra note 36, at 290–97; see also 
Ben Fine, Landed Property and the Distinction between Royalty and Rent, 58(3) LAND ECON. 338, 
343–45 (1982) (arguing that the question itself is irrelevant from a general equilibrium context). 
   56. Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39(2) J. POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 137–75 (1931). 
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able to use the resource in the future). This latter cost is now referred 
to as the Hotelling rent or user cost. 
Economist Alfred Marshall explained that, conceptually, a royalty 
is akin to the user cost because it compensates the owner of the mineral 
for the reduced opportunity to produce the mineral in the future.57 A 
tax on the user cost, unlike a tax on economic rent, would distort firm 
behavior because it would incentivize a firm to leave mineral resources 
in the ground for the future.58 Hotelling’s model implies that the 
optimal royalty schedule must induce the mining firm to exhaust the 
mine in such a way that marginal net benefits grow over time at the 
rate of discount.59 
Under this framework, the government would be justified in 
collecting a high royalty if the stock of the mineral were limited even if 
there were no economic rents.60 On the flip side, if the stock of the 
mineral were large relative to anticipated demand, the royalty would 
be lower.61 Arguing in favor of this aspect of a royalty, Orchard 
explains that the owner of a currently unprofitable coal deposit, one 
that does not earn economic rent, would not allow any mining without 
compensation, as he would “gain[ ] nothing” and “lose[ ] an asset that 
may bring in an income for himself or his heirs with a change in market 
conditions.”62 The owner would demand payment equal to the 
marginal or minimum royalty necessary to compensate the owner for 
his loss even in the absence of economic rent.63 
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, there is little evidence that 
user costs were a significant component of historical royalty rates for 
coal in the United States. This is largely because the supply of coal has 
not been perceived to be scarce, implying user costs close to zero,64 
 
   57. MARSHALL, supra note 55. 
   58. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 36. 
   59. See Hotelling, supra note 56, at 165–69; Gerard Gaudet et al., Optimal Resource Royalties 
with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures, 36(3) INT’L ECON. REV. 
715, 715 (1995) (“The well known Hotelling rule of natural resource extraction (Hotelling 1931) 
implies that if the mine owner wishes to maximize the present value of net benefits over the life 
of the mine, the royalty schedule must induce the mining firm to exhaust the mine in such a way 
that marginal net benefits grow over time at the rate of discount.”). 
   60. See Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36. 
 61. Id. 
   62. Orchard, supra note 36, at 295. 
   63. Id. at 296. 
   64. See OTTO ET AL., supra note 47, at 29; Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36 (“The federal 
government is receiving substantially higher royalty rates on new leases, but the higher current 
rates do not reflect a Marshallian royalty because the stock of western coal is virtually 
unlimited.”). 
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though economic theory would predict an increasing royalty rate over 
time as the resource becomes scarcer. 
Nonetheless, the concept of user costs has historically been 
relevant as a justification for royalty rates in the United States. U.S. 
mining operators and policymakers were aware of the user cost when 
determining and evaluating possible royalty rates. Both American 
mining operators quoted by Orchard referred to user costs in addition 
to economic rents—or, in their words, the part of the royalty “that must 
be paid, or else the landowner would not care to let the mine be 
worked,” or the part that essentially represented the “capitalization of 
assets.”65 And, in congressional hearings on the Federal Coal Leasing 
Amendments Act of 1976, there was concern that “it may not be 
desirable to encourage underground mining [via a lower royalty rate] 
until technology has evolved which will allow a higher percentage of 
recovery.”66 That concern is fundamentally about forgoing future less 
costly mine productivity as a result of present mining. 
Such a concern, in turn, can be analogized to concern about costly 
externalities caused by coal production. The landowner receives a 
royalty payment from coal production, but the landowner’s total 
benefit is reduced by the environmental damage to his land from the 
production. Such a landowner may prefer to wait to extract the coal 
until technology evolves that makes coal production less 
environmentally costly. When the government owns the land and 
minerals, concerns about the net social costs of production become 
even more relevant, as discussed in the next Section. 
C. Royalties and Externalities 
The concepts of economic rent and user cost roughly suggest that 
maximum net benefits would accrue to the public when the 
government directs royalties at capturing all economic rent and 
compensating the public for the user cost. But when resource 
extraction produces environmental and other costs to social welfare, 
unless corrective measures are taken, the level and rate of exploitation 
of the resources will be higher than is socially optimal.67 The concepts 
 
   65. Orchard, supra note 36, at 296. 
   66. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 391 Before the Subcomm. 
On Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the S. Comm. On Interior and Insular Affairs, 94 Cong. 504 
app. (1975) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 391]; see also Orchard, supra note 36, at 295–96. 
 67. See William D. Schulze, Optimal Use of Non-Renewable Resources: The Theory of 
Extraction, 1 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 53, 54 (1974) (arguing that considering cumulative 
environmental damages, Hotelling’s competitive extraction cannot yield Pareto optimal results); 
Timothy R. Muzondo, Mineral Taxation, Market Failure, and the Environment, 40(1) IMF STAFF 
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of economic rent and user cost do not directly address what the 
government should do in the face of such externalities. Nonetheless, 
economics provide a framework for thinking through this complex 
issue. 
As the White House Council for Economic Advisors recently 
explained, ensuring the optimal extraction of mineral resources on 
public land is akin to solving a principal-agent problem: the 
government (the principal) directs a coal firm (the agent) to efficiently 
extract the coal and return economic profits to the government.68 When 
the government is the mineral owner, its objective should be to develop 
the resource in such a way as to generate maximum net benefits for the 
public.69 In the best-case scenario, the government would itself 
efficiently extract the coal using the lowest-cost approaches at the 
optimal rate, taking into account both direct and external costs of 
production, and would keep economic rents and user costs for 
taxpayers’ benefit. 
In reality, the U.S. government does not extract the resources for 
itself and instead relies on coal firms to do so.70 Thus, a royalty payment 
would in theory allow the public to enjoy maximum net benefits from 
extraction by forcing the coal firms to internalize negative externalities 
and align their incentives with those of the government.71 This 
justification for a royalty is implicit in Orchard’s characterization of the 
minimum royalty as the landowner’s compensation for otherwise 
uncompensated environmental externalities of mining such as “the 
marring of the beauty of the locality with an ugly mine mouth, a black 
 
PAPERS 152, 160–62 (1993) (arguing that “cumulative environmental externalities will reduce the 
rate of growth of marginal profits over time”). 
 68. CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 2, 10; see also Gaudet et al., supra note 59, at 716 
(characterizing the situation as a principal-agent problem in which the government seeks to 
capture all economic rents). 
 69. See CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10 (“A common theme among all of these 
examples is the goal of maximizing return to the taxpayer from the use of the public resource to 
the extent feasible.”); see also GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36, at 3–4 (noting that 
maximizing government revenue can coincide with maximizing social welfare when, among other 
things, “externalities are compensated”); Schantz, supra note 47, at 36 (“When the 
government/landowner sells mineral rights, the rent ought to cover expected opportunity and 
environmental costs arising from anticipated mining activities.”); Orchard, supra note 36, at 313; 
OTTO ET AL., supra note 47, at 29–30. 
 70. See CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that the government should align 
its incentive with the coal companies to maximize public benefit). 
   71. See Muzondo, supra note 67, at 162 (“These results [after accounting for negative 
externalities in Hotelling’s model] suggest that in mining, where environmental taxes are rarely 
imposed, but specific taxes are popular with governments, such taxes can be considered proxies 
for current environmental externalities.”); Schantz, supra note 47, at 36. 
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coal tipple, or a dump heap.”72 The association of royalty payments 
with payments for residual environmental costs is also implicit in the 
fact that about half of the federal government’s revenues from royalty 
payments are returned to the states where mining occurs.73 The 
implications of this revenue-sharing policy are discussed in more detail 
in the next Part. 
The idea that the royalty can help align producer incentives with 
those of the government by addressing externalities is not new. For 
example, the existence of positive externalities such as “the stimulation 
of an infant industry and the development of mineral resources” was 
used as a “principal rationale” for imposing no royalties on the 
discovery and extraction of certain minerals in 1872.74 Historically, the 
fact that “[o]il and gas operations have minimal effect on surface use 
compared to coal operations which are usually highly disruptive to the 
surface” has been offered as a justification for different royalty rates 
between oil-and-gas extraction and coal production.75 The legislative 
history for the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 also 
indicates that U.S. policymakers were aware that “[o]ne manner by 
which [more costly] underground mining can be encouraged is by the 
use of a lower royalty rate on coal mined by underground methods.”76 
More recently, Radford Schantz, Jr., a member of a 1993 task force 
assembled by Interior for the economic analysis of royalty proposals, 
recalled that compensation for environmental impacts was a 
justification offered for a royalty at the time.77 In fact, according to him, 
 
   72. Orchard, supra note 36, at 295–96. In addition, this justification is implicit in the concern 
that “it may not be desirable to encourage underground mining [via a lower royalty rate] until 
technology has evolved which will allow a higher percentage of recovery be underground 
mining”—that is, a concern that society may benefit more if the resource is left in the ground and 
potentially mined at lower social cost in the future. Hearing on S. 391, supra note 66. 
   73. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL POLICY 1, 225 (Duke 
Univ. Press) (1983) (arguing, in 1981, that the royalty rate is excessive partly because states can, 
and do, get compensated for the “public costs of coal mining” through direct taxes). 
   74. SALVATORE LAZZARI, Cong. Research Serv., RL34268, THE FEDERAL ROYALTY AND 
TAX TREATMENT OF THE HARDROCK MINERAL INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORTS – TAXATION 20 (2008). Other commentators 
have noted that, practically speaking, the government would have been unable to enforce and 
collect a royalty in some regions, even if it did set one at that time. 
   75. Royalty Concepts and Present Applications to Federal Oil and Gas and Coal Leases, 19D 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1986). The fact that offshore oil-and-gas royalty rates are now 
significantly higher than minimum onshore coal royalty rates (18.75 percent for offshore drilling 
in the Gulf of Mexico versus 12.5 percent for surface-mined coal and 8 percent for underground 
coal) further underscores the need to reevaluate coal royalty rates. 
   76. See Hearing on S. 391, supra note 66. 
   77. See Schantz, supra note 47, at 36. 
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an initial proposal for dealing with pollution from abandoned mines 
involved using revenue from royalty payments, “underscoring the 
environmental aspect of the royalty.”78 There is also evidence outside 
the United States of governments using royalties to motivate changes 
in firm behavior. For example, in 1987, New Zealand introduced 
royalty payments to help reduce geothermal extraction from the 
Rotorua geothermal field.79 
Rather than favoring the use of royalties to achieve environmental 
goals, however, economists often emphasize that, from the standpoint 
of economic efficiency, direct economic instruments (such as a specific 
price or quantity condition on pollutants from mining activities) may 
be better suited to control environmental externalities.80 This is 
because these instruments could be directed at specific environmental 
problems and pollutants. Much of this concern is motivated by the idea 
that many environmental externalities produce site-specific damages,81 
though this concern is notably absent in the context of externalities 
from global pollutants like carbon dioxide and methane. 
Notwithstanding efficiency concerns, it is undeniable that the financial 
and environmental motivations underlying royalty payments “are not 
really separate” because, as Schantz explains, “[w]hen correctly 
measured, the wealth embodied in in-ground minerals is an indicator 
of their social utility value” and “[a]s such, it ought to be net of the 
social costs of mining, including the value of environmental impacts.”82 
In particular, when there are no direct instruments in use that require 
producers to internalize environmental externalities, royalty rates that 
account for these externalities can help to avoid undesirably high levels 
of production. 
In light of these considerations, Schantz models the government’s 
supply of a royalty as follows.83 The government landowner weighs the 
 
  78. Id. 
   79. See Bradley J. Scott & Ashley D. Cody, Response of the Rotorua Geothermal System to 
Exploitation and Varying Management Regimes, 29 GEOTHERMICS 543, 579 (2000). The royalty 
was effective, eventually resulting in signs of recovery for the reservoir. See id.; Brett W. 
O’Shaughnessy, Use of Economic Instruments in Management of Rotorua Geothermal Field, New 
Zealand, 29 GEOTHERMICS 539, 542 (2000). 
   80. See, e.g., Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36, at 167 (“Stated differently, assuming impact 
costs vary among locations, it is desirable from an efficiency perspective to adopt policies that 
discriminate according to site-specific impact costs rather than financing impact through 
severance taxes that are imposed at a uniform rate.”); Schantz, supra note 47, at 36. 
   81. Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Schantz, supra note 47, at 36. 
   82. Schantz, supra note 47, at 36. 
   83. Id. at 39; see also Orchard, supra note 36, at 295 –96 (suggesting the minimal royalty 
compensates the landowner in part for otherwise uncompensated externalities of mining such as 
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value of income from the sale against the value of what it gives away.84 
The government determines this latter value by evaluating: (1) 
opportunity cost, defined as the value of alternative uses of the land; 
(2) user cost; and (3) residual environmental impacts not mitigated by 
other laws or regulations.85 These considerations form the minimum 
royalty that the government would accept at each site (comparable to 
Orchard’s statement of the minimum royalty). The demand for leasing 
land for exploration and eventual mining, in turn, is determined by the 
prospector’s assessment of the expected value of exploration at the site. 
Assuming competitive bidding for each site, the optimal royalty that 
emerges is equal to the supply price for the site (the opportunity cost, 
user cost, and environmental cost) plus, if applicable, a premium for 
economic rents at certain sites generated by competition among 
prospectors.86 At the marginal site, this premium would be zero, and 
the royalty would equal the supply price.87 
Economists have modeled the effect of various forms of royalty 
and taxes in bringing production closer to the socially optimal level and 
rate, but many of the effects are ultimately dependent on the type of 
assessment scheme chosen for the royalty.88 In general, however, 
royalties take the form of ad valorem taxes, that is, taxes on the amount 
or value of the resource.89 Although an analysis of the optimal form of 
a royalty is beyond the scope of this article, there is a robust literature 
in economics about setting an optimal ad valorem tax in the context of 
externalities.90 For example, economist Evan F. Koenig has argued that 




“the marring of the beauty of the locality with an ugly mine mouth, a black coal tipple, or a dump 
heap”). 
   84. Schantz, supra note 47, at 39. 
 85. Id. 
   86. Id. at 40. 
   87. Id. 
   88. See, e.g., Muzondo, supra note 67, at 164–65 (summary table); Ita Falk, Dynamical 
Ecologic Taxes: Public Control for Interrelated Renewable Resources, 13 RESOURCE & ENERGY 
381 (1991) (evaluating various policies to deal with pollution in the context of Interrelated 
renewable resources). 
   89. See GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36, at 92–94. 
   90. See, e.g., Evan F. Koenig, Indirect Methods for Regulating Externalities under 
Uncertainty, 100(2) Q.J. ECON. 479 (1985) (calculating how the ad valorem tax rate can influence 
externalities); Jukka Pirttila, Specific Versus Ad Valorem Taxation and Externalities, 76(2) J. 
ECON. 177 (2002) (examining “the choice between specific and ad valorem taxes when the 
production of a good, produced under imperfect competition, creates harmful externalities”). 
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option that may outperform other regulation in appropriately 
accounting for externalities given uncertainty under certain 
conditions.91 
D. MINERAL ROYALTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Legislative history concerning coal and other mineral resource 
extraction in the United States demonstrates that leasing policies and 
royalty rates have consistently been used as policy levers to advance 
such goals as encouraging development and compensating the public 
for the removal and value of mineral resources. Congress has 
repeatedly made policy judgments with respect to the value of mineral 
resources; the desirability of promoting the development of particular 
types of resources; and, beginning in the 20th century, the best way to 
allocate revenue from resource extraction to the public and to 
communities affected by resource development. In addition, Congress 
has vested the Secretary of the Interior with broad authority to set 
royalty rates and manage federal fossil fuel leasing programs in order 
to best serve the national interest. 
A. Early U.S. Mineral Development and the Mineral Leasing Act 
One of the earliest records of the United States’ contemplation of 
mineral rights appears in the Northwest Territory in the Land 
Ordinance of May 20, 1787, which provided that “there shall be 
reserved . . . one-third part of all gold, silver, lead, and copper mines, 
to be sold, or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall hereafter 
direct.”92 But as the settlement of the United States expanded 
westward in the 19th century, the general policy of public land 
management was to convey land to private ownership in order to 
encourage settlement, farming, and mining.93 The gold rush of 1848 led 
Congress to consider mineral resource legislation, but it failed to take 
meaningful action to control western mineral resources, relying instead 
on local laws and customs already in place to manage mining.94 
 
   91. Koenig, supra note 90, at 491–92. 
   92. JOHN C. LACY, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MINING LAW: THE MINER’S LAW 
BECOMES LAW, IN THE MINING LAW OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 13, 16 
(1989). 
   93. Shelby D. Green, Reclaiming the Public Domain by Repeal of the Mining Law of 1872, 6 
HOFSTRA PROP. L. J. 85, 152 (1993) (citing LACY, supra note 92, at 16–17); LINDLEY, supra note 
25, §§ 54–57, at 81–85 (declaring the policy of the United States to promote westward expansion). 
   94. Green, supra note 95, at n.21; see also LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 48, at 76–78 (describing 
competing concerns in Congress); LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 41, at 63–64 (describing the rise of 
gap-filling local customs). 
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Starting in the second half of the 19th century, Congress began to 
treat coal differently from other minerals, as its value as an energy 
source became clear. In 1864 and again in 1873, Congress enacted the 
Coal Lands Acts authorizing private purchase in fee simple95 of lands 
classified by the Department of the Interior as valuable for coal; those 
statutes set a maximum limit of 160 acres on individual entry and 
minimum prices of $10 to $20 per acre.96 Congress enacted the General 
Mining Law of 1872 to regulate other minerals; that statute authorized 
the sale of public lands in fee simple to mining claimants at rates of 
$2.50 to $5.00 per acre.97 The Coal Lands Acts and General Mining Act 
of 1872 helped develop the West by allowing individuals to obtain 
exclusive rights to mine billions of dollars’ worth of gold, silver, coal, 
and other hardrock minerals from federal lands without having to pay 
a federal royalty.98 
At the turn of the 20th century, Congress began to discuss ways to 
retain federal control of its mineral resources out of concern for the 
price and supply of coal.99 Congress passed the Coal Lands Act of 
1909,100 which authorized the issuance of patents to “[a]ny person who 
has in good faith located, selected, or entered under the nonmineral 
land laws of the United States any lands which subsequently are 
classified, claimed, or reported as being valuable for coal,” upon proof 
of compliance with land laws.101 The Act, however, mandated that the 
patent “shall contain a reservation to the United States of all coal in 
said lands, and the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same.”102 
Thus, the statute aimed to reconcile the twin goals of the federal 
government at that time: to settle the West and to retain federal 
ownership of valuable mineral resources. 
Legislative history leading up to the passage of the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 reveals a desire among members of Congress to 
 
   95. Fee simple refers to permanent and absolute ownership of property, with freedom to 
dispose of it at will. 
   96. See Act of July 1, 1864, ch. 205, § 1, 13 Stat. 343 (allowing private individuals to bid on 
“mines”); Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 279, § 1, 17 Stat. 607. 
   97. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 26, 29, 30, 37 (2012). 
   98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION ON STATE 
ROYALTIES AND THE NUMBER OF ABANDONED MINE SITES AND HAZARDS (July 14, 2009), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123013.pdf. 
   99. See Hearings on Coal Lands and Coal-Land Laws of the United States Before the House 
Comm. on Pub. Lands, *4 59th Cong. 11 –13 (1907) (testimony of Edgar E. Clark, Interstate 
Commerce Commissioner). 
   100. Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 81). 
   101. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (2012). 
   102. Id. 
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retain public ownership of mineral resources.103 Royalty rates were 
described as a way to “assure the Government an adequate return from 
lessees,”104 and represented the way in which “the community shares in 
the element of value.”105 Some representatives from states with federal 
land within their borders expressed concern that “the communities in 
which these great resources lie would not obtain any considerable part 
of the cream of the values taken from them in the way of royalty.”106 
This concern has persisted today, in calls for a greater portion of 
royalties to be returned to states in which minerals lie and to coastal 
states closest to federal offshore mineral tracts. (See discussion later in 
this Section.) Other members of Congress were apprehensive about 
the broad grant of authority to Interior in the draft bill that would 
become the Mineral Leasing Act, stating that “the Secretary of the 
Interior is given practically unlimited authority as to the granting and 
the terms and conditions of leases.”107 
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides for the disposition of 
reserved minerals, including coal, oil, and natural gas, on federal lands 
subject to enumerated lease terms and payments. The Act sets a 
minimum royalty rate for “the privileges of mining or extracting the 
coal in the lands covered by the lease” payable to the United States of 
“not . . . less than 5 cents per ton of two thousand pounds.”108 The 
Mineral Leasing Act also states that the Secretary of the Interior can 
include coal, oil, or natural gas lease terms that she or he deems 
necessary “to insure the sale of the production of such leased lands to 
the United States and to the public at reasonable prices, for the 
protection of the interests of the United States, for the prevention of 
monopoly, and for the safeguarding of the public welfare.”109 Thus, 
lease terms were to be adjusted by the Secretary in order to advance 
national interests. Royalties during this period were based on cents per 
 
   103. Senator Walsh highlighted issues with the prior fee simple system and the goal of 
retaining federal control over federal lands, stating, “Some possible criticism might be made, as it 
seems to me, of an act which would contemplate the complete alienation of the land, by which 
they were to pass entirely out of the ownership and control of the Government of the United 
States, that by reason of legislation of that character they might possibly get into the hands of 
some great interest—the oil lands, for instance, getting into the hands of Standard Oil Co.” James 
D. Harris, The Linowes Commission – Where Are We 25 Years Later?, 1 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
INST. 3, 3–7 (2007) (quoting 43 Cong. Rec. 4251 (1919)). 
   104. 51 Cong. Rec. 14,945 (Sept. 10, 1914) (statement by Mr. Thomson of Illinois). 
   105. Id. at 14,955. 
   106. Id. at 14,951. 
   107. Id. at 14,954. 
   108. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, Sec. 7. 
    111.    30 U.S.C. § 187 (2012). 
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ton and varied with the quality of coal and associated difficulties of 
mining it; this method changed to “a percentage of value royalty” 
tailored to mining conditions and coal quality in the late 1960s.110 
B. “Fair Market Value” and Royalties as Compensation for 
Externalities 
By the early 1970s, the environmental movement was gaining 
momentum in the United States.111 Policymakers sought to reconcile 
competing federal policy aims, such as producing domestic energy 
resources and ensuring environmental protection. Legislative history 
leading up to the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act in 1976 shows that Congress sought to use federal royalties as a 
policy lever to help effectuate multiple goals for federal mineral 
production, including compensating states and the public for mineral 
production externalities, providing revenue to the federal government, 
and incentivizing certain types of production. 
In 1970, the congressionally established bipartisan Public Land 
Law Review Commission recommended that all federal lands be 
retained in federal ownership unless disposal to private parties would 
achieve a greater benefit and provide equitable compensation. In 
establishing guidelines for public land management, the Commission 
stated, “[t]he end result, of course, is to achieve the maximum benefit 
for the general public . . . .”112 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 requires 
that the United States “receive fair market value of the use of the 
public lands and their resources unless otherwise provided for by 
statute.”113 The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 
likewise specifies that no bid may be accepted which is less than “the 
fair market value, as determined by the Secretary, of the coal subject 
to the lease.”114 The term “fair market value” is not defined in either 
 
   110. Federal Coal Leasing: Hearing on S. 3528 Before the Subcomm. On Mines and Mining of 
the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93 Cong. 60 (1974), HRG-1974-IIA-0082 (statement 
of Jack O. Horton, Assistant Secretary, Land and Water Resources, Department of the Interior) 
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 3528]. 
   111. For instance, primary responsibility for environmental protection began to shift from the 
states to the federal government with passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 
and expansion of the Clean Air Act in 1970, among other federal statutes. See National 
Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970); Clean Air Act Extension of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
    112.  PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 1, 38 (1970). 
    113.  Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012). 
    114.  Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083, 1087 
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statute. In 1982—the last time that Interior convened a working group 
to comprehensively review its fair market value procedures—the task 
force determined that “fair market value” was not merely the value of 
the resource discovered or produced, but the value of “the right” to 
explore and, if there is a discovery, to develop and produce the energy 
resource.115 Indeed, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
refers to the value of using the lands, and not solely to the value of the 
resources. 
Central to the question of how royalties interact with externalities, 
the legislative history of both the Federal Land Policy and 
Management and the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 
reflects a concern that states be paid a greater share of federal royalties 
to account for social and environmental externalities incurred by 
resource production. Congressional testimony leading up to the 
passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in 1976 
reveals support for revenue sharing provisions that would direct a 
portion of revenue from federal fossil fuel production to the states 
where production occurs in order to “help county government[s] cope 
with energy development impact problems.”116 
In considering a bill leading up to passage of the Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, which would direct an additional 
12.5 percent of royalty revenues to states with federal leases within 
their borders (in addition to the 37.5 percent they already received at 
that time), the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated, 
“[w]hen an area is newly opened to large scale mining, local 
governmental entities must assume the responsibility of providing 
public services needed for new communities, including schools, roads, 
hospitals, sewers, police protection, and other public facilities, as well 
as adequate local planning for the development of the community.”117  
The legislative history also reflects concern as to “the waste of valuable 
resources, and the creation of severe environmental impacts.”118 
 
 
(1976), codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. 
     115.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD 
ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE 
MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 3 (Dec. 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf. 
   116. Bills to Provide for the Management, Protection, and Development of the National 
Resource Lands, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1507 and S. 1292 Before the Subcomm. on 
Env’t. and Land Res. of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 1 (1975), HRG-
1975-IIA-0120 (statement of James Evans, Legislative Rep., National Association of Counties). 
        117.   H.R. Rep. 94-681, 38, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1975 WL 12515 (Leg. Hist.). 
     118.    Id. at 20. 
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The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act increased the state 
share of revenue from federal coal royalties, provided that the state 
share be used by “giving priority to those subdivisions of the State 
socially or economically impacted by development of minerals leased 
under this chapter, for (i) planning, (ii) construction and maintenance 
of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public service . . . .”119 Thus, 
the Act directly links receipt of mineral production revenues to 
compensation for the social and environmental costs of mineral 
production. 
Furthermore, coastal states and their congressional 
representatives have repeatedly advocated for a greater share of 
offshore oil and natural gas revenue due to significant potential 
impacts from these activities on coastal infrastructure and the 
environment.120 According to coastal states, these revenues are needed 
to mitigate environmental impacts and to maintain the necessary 
support structure for the offshore oil and gas industry.121 In addition, 
the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 directs coastal states 
to use their share of royalty payments from offshore drilling for “the 
purposes of coastal protection, including conservation, coastal 
restoration, hurricane protection, and infrastructure directly affected 
by coastal wetland losses,” and “[m]itigation of damage to fish, wildlife, 
 
  119. 30 U.S.C. § 191(a) (2012). 
     120.    See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NO. R40645, U. S. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
RESOURCES: PROSPECTS AND PROCESSES 19 (April 26, 2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/142736.pdf; see also Senate Hearing 113–122, Revenue Sharing Hearing before the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Session 
to Consider S. 1273, The Fair Act of 2013 (July 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113shrg85874/html/CHRG-113shrg85874.htm (stating, inter alia, “[r]evenue sharing is vital for 
these [coastal] areas to adequately respond to all sorts of impacts associated with enormous 
influxes of people and equipment;” “[s]tates and communities will have less incentive to support 
this development if they’re expected to shoulder risks and absorb impacts with no opportunity 
for revenue sharing;” “there are also cumulative impacts of offshore energy development such as 
habitat degradation and coastal erosion that are typically not mitigated at the project level, and it 
is important for states to address these impacts. Therefore, a significant portion of a state’s 
revenue share should be directed to addressing those unmitigated cumulative impacts, including 
through coastal protection and restoration and investments in natural infrastructure such as 
forested wetlands, marshes, oyster reefs, barrier islands, and dune systems.”). 
     121.  Id. Of course, to the extent that states receive a greater proportion of the royalty as 
compensation for social, environmental, or economic impacts, the federal government will receive 
less unless the royalty rate is increased. Rather than reduce the federal government’s share of the 
royalty simply because some externalities are borne by the states, Interior could—and should, 
from a welfare-maximizing perspective—increase the royalty rate in order to shift more of the 
externality costs onto fossil fuel producers and arrive at a more socially optimal royalty rate. See 
Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy 
Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming, Feb. 2018) (on file with author). 
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or natural resources,” among other delineated uses.122 Moreover, the 
federal Land and Water Conservation Fund, established in 1965, uses 
federal offshore oil and gas revenues to build and maintain public parks 
and protect open space across the country.123 
Congressional efforts to modernize hardrock mining law also link 
royalties to compensation for negative externalities. Pursuant to the 
General Mining Law of 1872, one of the last remaining vestiges of the 
public land giveaways, companies can mine hardrock minerals on 
federal land without paying any royalties.124 The Hardrock Mining and 
Reclamation Act of 2007 would have imposed a royalty of 4 percent of 
gross revenues on existing mining and 8 percent on new mining 
operations.125 Seventy percent of the royalty revenue would have been 
directed to a cleanup fund for past abandoned mining operations, and 
30 percent to affected communities.126 Similarly, the Hardrock Mining 
and Reclamation Act of 2009 would have directed the Secretary of the 
Interior to establish a royalty rate of between 8 and 15 percent of the 
value of mineral production from new mines on federal lands, with 
royalties and reclamation taxes used to reclaim abandoned hardrock 
mines.127 Neither bill was passed into law. 
Finally, a recent federal regulatory effort aimed at reducing 
externalities from oil and natural gas production also recognized that 
royalty payments can be employed as policy levers. The Bureau of 
Land Management’s 2016 final rule requiring methane emission 
reductions for oil and gas producers on federal lands exempts captured 
methane, the majority of which comes from natural gas, from royalties 
owed to the federal government.128 This royalty-free natural gas can be 
analogized to the “fair use” exemption from royalties in another 
familiar field, copyright law.129 In both contexts, policymakers 
 
      122.   See 30 C.F.R § 519.410(a)(2) (2014). 
   123. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 200302, 200305 (2012). 
   124. The General Mining Law of 1872, codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–54 (2012). 
   125. Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2007, H.R. 2262, 110th Cong. (2007). 
   126. Id. 
   127. Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, H.R. 699, 111th Cong. (2009) 
   128. See Bureau of Land Management, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, 
and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83008, 83043 (Nov. 18, 2016) (stating, “this section sets 
forth the general rule that royalty is not due on oil or gas that is produced from a lease or 
communitized area and used for operations and production purposes (including placing oil or gas 
in marketable condition) on the same lease or communitized area without being removed from 
the lease or communitized area.”). 
     129.  In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified the fair use doctrine, which developed 
in the courts as an “equitable rule of reason which permits courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed 
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established a royalty-free “fair use” in order to advance the societal 
interest by, for example, incentivizing actions with positive 
externalities like capturing methane for local reuse at well sites, or 
using copyrighted material for educational purposes.130 
Interior has also adjusted royalty rates for other purposes, 
including incentivizing certain types of resource production and 
capturing more value for the federal government. Surface coal 
produced has long been subject to a 12.5 percent federal royalty, while 
underground coal has been set at 8 percent.131 The main reason 
provided in the legislative history for giving Interior discretion to treat 
royalty rates for surface mining and underground mining differently 
was the perception that underground mining was more difficult and 
would produce less valuable coal.132 
Finally, Interior raised the offshore oil and gas royalty rate in 2007 
in response to a number of factors, including increased oil and gas 
prices, technological improvements that made exploration and 
production more efficient, and the competitive market for leases.133 
Former Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said that increasing the offshore 
rate was necessary to ensure that “the American taxpayer is getting a 
fair return for the oil and gas that the American people own;” he also 
pointed to higher state onshore rates for oil and gas as a possible 
 
to foster.” See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94 553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). Fair use provides a defense for infringing copyright 
uses which are permissible because their overall value to society outweighs the copyright owner’s 
interest in enforcing its property boundaries. In other words, Congress made a policy judgment 
to set the “royalty rate” at zero for some uses of copyrighted material. 
   130. See, e.g., Manal Z. Khalil, The Applicability of the Fair Use Defense to Commercial 
Advertising: Eliminating Unfounded Limitations, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 661–62 (1992) 
(arguing that the fair use doctrine “acknowledges the social desirability of permitting others to 
build upon copyrighted works”); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market 
Failures: A Case for A Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L. J. 
579, 610–11 (2005) (arguing that “the strongest case for royalty-free fair use is the large number 
of positive externalities that are created through the use of creative/copyrightable subject 
matter”). 
   131.   43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(2) (2014); see 55 Fed. Reg. 2653-01 (Jan. 26, 1990). 
   132. See Hearing on S. 3528, supra note 110, at 62 (“You could certainly logically expect to 
have much less [sic] amounts bid in a competitive sale for deep coal if you had the same royalty 
for surface coal and deep coal.”); see also COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 
IN ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL COAL-LEASING PROGRAM 1100 (1972) (“[H]e also might 
produce much less if he had per ton a higher royalty payment, so he might produce only the richest 
coal and not go into the less rich coal because of the higher royalty figure.”). 
   133. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-14-50, OIL AND GAS 
RESOURCES: ACTIONS NEEDED FOR INTERIOR TO BETTER ENSURE A FAIR RETURN 13–14 
(Dec. 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659515.pdf. 
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justification for raising the onshore federal rate for oil and gas.134 
Overall, the legislative history of congressional laws concerning 
the extraction of coal and other mineral resources demonstrates that 
leasing policies and royalty rates have been used pragmatically, 
reflecting policy concerns and concepts of compensation and fairness, 
including earning “fair market value.”135 Adjusting state or federal 
royalty rates to meet valid policy goals, like reducing environmental 
externalities, would be in line with the U.S. government’s long history 
of setting the terms and conditions of leasing its land for mineral 
extraction to reflect policy priorities. 
E. LESSONS FROM PRIVATE ROYALTIES 
So far, common law history, economic theory, and U.S. legislative 
history have underscored the appropriateness of federal and state 
governments acting as landowners and, in the interests of their 
respective citizens, adjusting mineral royalty rates to enhance public 
welfare. In this endeavor, private royalty rates and mineral resource 
leases might appear to be less relevant. In reality, however, these 
private decisions are influenced by similar factors, including expected 
economic rent, characteristics of the resource, competition for leases, 
and externalities that may affect the leaseholder, such as noise and 
pollution.136 Examining the factors that private parties consider when 
attempting to maximize their self-interest further underscores the 
validity of similar factors that the government may consider in setting 
royalties to advance societal goals. 
Outside of any required state minimum, the exact value of a 
royalty rate can be negotiated between the mineral owner and the 
production company. The rates therefore vary and often depend on the 
 
   134. Hon. Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 2013, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (Feb. 16, 2012), pp. 46–47,  
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg74739/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg74739.pdf (“The 
underlying principle is we are mandated by statute, mandated by fairness to make sure the 
American taxpayer is getting a fair return for the assets the American people own.”). 
   135. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012) (stating 
that it is policy that “the United States receive fair market value of the use of public lands and 
their resources unless otherwise provided for by statute”). 
   136. See COLORADO OIL & GAS ASSOC., THE BASICS: MINERAL RIGHTS, ROYALTIES & 
SURFACE USE AGREEMENTS (2013), http://www.coga.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09 
/3Basics_MineralRights.pdf; Christopher Timmins & Ashley Vissing, Shale Gas Leases: Is 
Bargaining Efficient and What Are the Implications for Homeowners if it is Not? (Dept. of Econ., 
Duke Univ., Working Paper, 2014), http://public.econ.duke.edu/~timmins/ 
Timmins_Vissing_11_15.pdf. 
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negotiation power and skills of each party. Negotiation power, in turn, 
depends on how many acres of resource the mineral owner owns, how 
close the land is to “proven production,” and how many other 
companies are competing for the specific lease.137 As expected, the 
owner of “a large tract next to a newly discovered field with numerous 
oil companies vying for the lease” would possess a significant amount 
of negotiation power138 and could negotiate a high royalty rate for the 
lease. Economists Christopher Timmins and Ashley Vissing have 
found that demographic factors are also associated with negotiation 
power, with high-income mineral owners able to negotiate higher 
royalty rates.139 
In negotiating the substance of these private leases, the parties 
often take into account pollution, surface disruptions, and other 
externalities. For example, mineral owners, in addition to negotiating 
the royalty rate, can negotiate lease terms such as environmental 
clauses that encourage the use of safeguards to prevent contamination 
of soil and water, and noise clauses that require the use of mufflers with 
loud equipment.140 And in cases when mineral rights and surface rights 
are held separately (commonly referred to as a split-estate), the surface 
owner can negotiate compensation for protection from “unreasonable 
encroachment and damage” to the surface.141 One 1979 commentator 
urged that “[l]andowner-lessors should provide for escalating royalty 
payments according to the type of mining method used” to account for 
differences in waste production.142 
F. CONCLUSION 
Royalties have several commonly accepted justifications, 
including sharing in economic rent, compensating the owner for 
removal of a nonrenewable resource, and compensating the owner for 
negative externalities associated with production of the resource. 
While the externality justification appears much more frequently in 
 
   137. Judon Fambrough, REAL ESTATE CENTER, TEX. A&M UNIV., HINTS ON NEGOTIATING 
AN OIL & GAS LEASE 3 (2015) [hereinafter Hints], https://assets.recenter.tamu.edu/ 
documents/articles/229.pdf. 
   138. Id. 
   139. Timmins & Vissing, supra note 138. 
   140. Id. at 72. 
   141. ANTHONY ANDREWS, UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SHALES: DEVELOPMENT, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 27 (2010). 
   142. Laurence W. Hancock, Note, Preventive Law and the Negotiating and Drafting of Coal 
Leases after the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 733, 746–
47 (1979). 
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recent economic literature and legislative history, royalties have been 
used as a policy lever to promote social welfare for centuries. Historical 
uses, accepted economic justifications, legislative history, and 
examples of royalty use by private actors all support the determination 
that it would be appropriate for federal and state governments to 
increase fossil fuel royalty rates to account for externality costs. 
Indeed, doing so would be an expedient and potentially lucrative way 
to align natural resources leasing with greenhouse gas reduction goals, 
even as other mechanisms to address climate change appear infeasible 
in the current political environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
